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Central Intelligence Bulletin

13 Sept 73

Declassified and Approved for Release July 2000

Top Secret

13 September 1973

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CHILE: Armed resistance to the military junta stiffened in Santiago yesterday, but the new government continued to strengthen its measures of control.

Leftist snipers holed up in government buildings and armed groups occupying factories are effectively using such heavy weapons as rocket launchers, mortars, and machine guns against military attackers. Casualties on both sides are probably much heavier than the junta will reveal. The deadline for surrendering arms has been shortened, and summary execution decreed for violators.

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The junta has named a military cabinet on the advice of civilian advisers, and apparently intends to retain power until the armed services chiefs believe that they have the Chilean house in order. The military has assumed responsibility for the judicial process and all public administration. It is also moving swiftly to organize transportation and the supply of now critically scarce food and other commodities.

ARMY GENERAL PINOCHET WILL CONTINUE AS PRESI-DENT OF THE JUNTA FOR AT LEAST A YEAR, A FERIOD HE CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO **STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT, **

HE WANTS LOW-KEY BUT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE US, WHICH HE HOPES CAN ASSIST CHILE WITH FOOD, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND DEBT RELIEF FOR A WHILE. PINOCHET SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, HAD NOT GIVEN ANY HINTS TO THE US AS TO THEIR DEVELOPING RESOLVE TO ACT. TO ENSURE THAT THEIR TAKE-OVER WORKS, THEY PLAN AMONG OTHER THINGS TO OUTLAW THE PARTIES THAT SUPPORTED ALLENDE.

International reaction to the coup has been vehement and widespread. Several governments expressed regret over the ouster of an elected government

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Leftist groups staged protest demonstrations in many capitals. Like Peron in Argentina,
most accused the US of complicity in Allende's downfall. The junta's hostility toward several Communist governments represented in Santiago is heightened by the fact that many Allende supporters have
apparently taken refuge in their embassies. A serious shootout at the Cuban Embassy may be only the
first of such incidents if the junta refuses to
allow the refugees to leave.

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